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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20020401-CA 
vs. 
STACY ANDYAS FRISON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distributing or agreeing, consenting, 
offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). This 
Court has appellate jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases not involving first 
degree felonies pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the evidence suffice to support defendant's conviction for distributing a 
controlled substance (cocaine), where the trier-of-fact could reasonably infer from 
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the evidence that defendant knew that his friend and passenger was distributing 
cocaine and intentionally aided him in the enterprise? 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate 
court must sustain the trial court's judgment unless, after giving "deference to the 
trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor," the 
appellate court finds that the judgment is "against the clear weight of the evidence" 
or "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Goodman, 162> P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). The trier-of-fact may draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence before it. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, f 6, 36 P.3d 533. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant provisions are included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000) (distribution of a 
controlled substance); and 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202 (1999) (responsibility for conduct of 
another). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with unlawfully distributing or 
offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, 
cocaine. R. 2, 50-52. The charge was based on an incident that occurred on or 
about July 10, 2000, at 800 South State Street, Salt Lake City. R. 51. Defendant 
waived his right to a jury trial, and the district court conducted a bench trial on 
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September 17, 2001. R. 66, 72. The State's witnesses testified to defendant's 
involvement in three drug transactions—an initial transaction on July 6, 2002 
(uncharged), a second transaction on July 6, 2002 (count I), and a transaction on 
July 10, 2002 (count II). R. 166:11, 53-55. Defendant was acquitted on count I. 
R. 69; 166:53-55. He was found guilty on count II and sentenced to an 
indeterminate one-to-fifteen-year prison term. R. 69, 72, 113, 166:54-44. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 118, 123. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was present on three occasions when his friend Gary Moore sold 
drugs to Shawn Player, an undercover police officer: 
(1) Uncharged conduct On July 6, 2000, a confidential informant introduced 
Player to Moore, and Player and Moore completed "an introductory buy." 
R. 166:8. On that date, Player gave money to the confidential informant in 
defendant's presence, and the confidential informant purchased cocaine from 
Moore. Id. The drug sale took place in the back seat of defendant's Chevrolet 
Impala. Id. at 9, 26. Defendant was in the driver's seat, and Moore was in the 
front passenger seat. Id. Player and the confidential informant climbed into the 
backseat. Id. Defendant appeared nervous and suspicious of Player. Id. at 10. He 
turned around, looked back at Player, and looked Player up and down "as if he 
were sizing [Player] up or checking [Player] to see if [Player] had anything that 
would make him nervous . . . weapons, wires, something like that." Id. at 10. 
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(2) Conduct resulting in Count I acquittal Approximately three hours later 
that day, Player called Moore stating that he wanted another "fifty/' "a term used 
for a quantity of rock cocaine." Id. at 11. Moore told Player to go to a 
convenience store at 900 West and 1300 South. Id. at 12. When Player pulled into 
the parking lot, he saw "the same [vehicle] that [he] had gotten into" earlier parked 
across the street with the hood up. Id. at 12. Defendant, who had been peering 
under the hood, looked around, walked to the front of the car, shut the hood, 
continued scanning the area, got into the car, drove across the street, and pulled up 
next to Player in the convenience store lot. Moore, who was also in the car, said to 
Player, "Follow us." Id. at 13. Player followed them to Jordan Park where Moore 
exited defendant's vehicle, walked to Player's truck, and climbed inside. Id. at 14. 
Moore gave Player crack cocaine, and Player gave Moore $50. Id. Moore then 
climbed back into defendant's vehicle, and Moore and defendant drove away. Id. at 
15. 
(3) Conduct resulting in Count II conviction. On July 10, 2000, Player called 
Moore and said he "would like to buy another fifty." Id. at 15. Moore instructed 
Player to meet him at the Sears parking lot. Id. at 15. Player, who arrived first, 
saw Moore and defendant approaching, this time in defendant's Buick Riviera. Id. 
at 15, 26. Again, defendant was driving and Moore was sitting in the front 
passenger seat. Id. A third male was seated behind defendant. Id. 
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When the car stopped, Player climbed in behind Moore. Id. Defendant then 
began driving slowly through the parking lot, "looking from side to side" and 
apparently "checking things out." Id. at 16-17. Player thought defendant was 
checking to make certain there was nothing to "interrupt the deal" and that "there 
weren't any police around." Id. at 18. Player testified that defendant was 
"deliberately moving his head from side to side, scanning the area," that he was 
doing something more than merely keeping a driver's careful outlook in a busy lot, 
and that "he was definitely searching for something." Id. 
While defendant was scanning the area, Moore laid his arm over the front 
bench seat next to defendant and opened his hand slightly behind the seat to show 
Player a twist of cocaine. Id. at 16. Player then said, "It was fifty; right?" Id. 
Moore said, "[Y]eah." Player then pulled the money from his pocket, took the rock 
cocaine from Moore's hand, and placed the money in Moore's hand. Id. at 16-17. 
Moore then brought his hand back into the front seat. Id. at 17. Player could not 
say with certainty that defendant had seen the transaction, but thought that 
defendant might have seen it. Id. at 24. Player, however, believed that defendant 
had "heard the conversation." Id. at 17. Player observed that the occupants of the 
vehicle could "easily hear each other." Id. at 26. 
The vehicle traveled thirty or forty feet through the parking lot during the 
conversation and transaction. Id. at 18. Then, although no one asked defendant to 
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stop the vehicle, defendant "just decided to stop the car near the end of the parking 
lot," and Player opened the door and got out. Id. at 19. 
Defendant's version 
Defendant called only one witness, his friend Gary Moore, who had already 
been convicted for his role in the offense. Id. at 33. Moore described his 
relationship with defendant: "His [defendant's] brother is married to my—my 
deceased auntie,, so that makes us in the family." Id. at 42. 
Moore testified that defendant was not involved in the drug transaction. Id. at 
31. Moore stated that he told defendant that he needed a ride to "look[] for an 
apartment, a job." Id. at 34. On cross-examination, Moore testified that he did not 
remember ever going to Jordan Park with defendant, that he had never been in 
defendant's Riviera, and that he had never in his life seen Player. Id. at 38-40. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant knew that Moore 
was distributing a controlled substance and intentionally aided him by driving him 
to the transaction location and maintaining a lookout during the drug buy. It thus 
suffices to support his conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT KNEW THAT HIS PASSENGER WAS DISTRIBUTING 
DRUGS AND THAT DEFENDANT AIDED IN THE DISTRIBUTION 
BY DRIVING TO AND FROM THE TRANSACTION AND BY 
MAINTAINING A LOOKOUT DURING THE TRANSACTION 
Defendant argues that the evidence does not suffice to support the bench trial 
verdict. Br. Aplt. at 11. Specifically, he claims that "the evidence does not legally 
support the inference of [his] culpable knowledge or intentional involvement in the 
drug deals." Id. To the contrary, the circumstantial and direct evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it do support the verdict. 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate 
court must sustain the trial court's judgment unless, after giving "deference to the 
trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor," the 
appellate court finds that the judgment is "against the clear weight of the evidence" 
or "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). The evidence in support of the judgment includes "a// reasonable 
inferences" that can be drawn from the evidence. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT 
App 355, f 6, 36 P.3d 533 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The State never argued that defendant actually sold the drugs in question. 
Rather, the State argued that defendant intentionally "facilitated]" the sales. See 
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R. 166:29, 48. In other words, the State argued that defendant was criminally 
responsible as an accomplice. "Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct." Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202 (1999), 
Evidence that a person is present is not sufficient to show criminal liability 
under the accomplice statute. "Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not 
make one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages or assists 
in perpetration of the crime/* State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah App. 
1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "However, while mere 
presence at the scene of a crime affords no basis for a conviction, presence, 
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from 
which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, the evidence showed that the defendant was more than merely present 
during the July 10 drug transaction. It showed conduct from which the trier of fact 
could infer that defendant intentionally aided Moore in the distribution of cocaine. 
First, the evidence showed that defendant had reason to know why Moore and 
Player were meeting. Defendant had been present on the two other occasions when 
Moore sold cocaine to Player. R. 166:8, 11-15. In the first of those occasions, 
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defendant had been in the car during the actual money-drug exchange. Id. at 8. 
Second, defendant could hear, if not see, the July 10 drug transaction. Id. at 15-17, 
26. Player testified that defendant could easily hear the conversation, including the 
comment, "It was fifty, right?" Id. at 16. 
Further, testimony indicated that defendant aided Moore in the offense. 
Testimony was offered from which the trier-of-fact could reasonably have found 
that defendant not only drove Moore to the sale location, but acted as a lookout 
while the transaction occurred. Id. at 16-18. "A person who acts as a 'look-out* 
during the commission of a [crime] is participating in the commission of that crime 
within the meaning of the [aiding and abetting statute]/' American Fork v. Rothe, 
2000 UT App 277, f 10, 12 P.3d 108 (alterations in original; internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Further, it is the trial court's prerogative, when acting 
as trier-of-fact, "to infer from [a defendant's] actions that he was acting as [a] 
lookout." Id. at % 1. 
The trial court found, in fact, that "credible" testimony had been presented to 
show "that the defendant had witnessed another buy where he clearly saw and heard 
language about a buy." R. 166:54. The trial court observed that the July 10 buyer 
was the same undercover officer involved in the earlier buy. Id. The trial court 
further found that the term "fifty" used in the July 10 buy sufficed to show that a 
transaction was occurring. Id. The trial court found it "clear that [defendant] knew 
someone was being picked up that he'd seen in another . . . compromising drug 
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scenario several days before, and that he heard words that would alert any normal 
person to the fact that some transaction was taking place." Id. at 54-55. Based on 
these circumstances the court found that "defendant knew it was [a transaction 
involving] controlled substances," that "a meeting had been arranged," and that "it 
was clear [defendant] was participating." Id. at 55. She further found that 
defendant "knew what was occurring and he assisted in the transaction by driving 
the vehicle and keeping a look-out and not interfering with what was going on, 
specifically with the distribution of a controlled substance." Id. The evidence 
sufficed to support the trial court's findings that defendant knew Moore was 
involved in criminal conduct and that he intentionally aided Moore in that conduct. 
The evidence therefore sufficed to support defendant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ httM^ltj If, , 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
y t u w ^ 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
mt Attorney General 
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Addendum 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;.... 
Amended by Chapter 12,1999 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 303,1999 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 58 11011.ZIP 5,896 Bytes 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Enacted by Chapter 196,1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_02007.ZIP 3,527 Bytes 
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